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Why do States Comply with AntiTrafficking Norms? A Study In
Eastern Europe
by Maren Reynolds Perkins

Introduction
One of the most pertinent questions facing the international community is the efficacy of its human rights framework. International organizations have drafted numerous human rights treaties that do not necessarily correlate with practices in member
states. A country may have ratified numerous agreements but this does not mean that
the country abides by their precepts or even stops its current human rights abuses.
Whether or not states comply with human rights treaties and why they choose to do
so is a salient question in international relations with important ramifications for the
future of treaties and international cooperation on human rights.
Human trafficking is one of the world's three largest illegal trades after drugs
and arms (UNDP 2007, 10). The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, was opened for signature in November 2000
as a supplement to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and
it went into force in December 2003. It is a detailed model defining human trafficking
and explaining what states must do to comply with anti-trafficking norms. However,
ratifying it does not necessarily lead to better protection. The question must be asked,
does ratifying a treaty lead to better compliance? And if not, what does? This paper
tests the theory that in the case of the Protocol, eastern European countries that ratify
will comply because of a value for women, not because of ratification itself. As an
alternative hypothesis, the paper also looks at dependency on entities such as the u.s.
and EU that oppose sex trafficking. This will be tested qualitatively using congruence
tables and process tracing.
The results of this study show overall that a culture of valuing women's rights
does not lead to better compliance with anti-trafficking norms. Instead the results
of both the congruence tables and process tracing show that states are more likely
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to comply because they are dependent on anti-trafficking entities. In particular, Romania points to a strong case for ED membership conditionality as a reason for
compliance. Furthermore, this study shows as predicted that ratification itself does
not lead to better compliance. In fact, the countries studied that had not ratified the
Protocol had overall better compliance scores than those who had ratified early.
Thus, this study proves the theories that ratification itself does not cause states to
comply with anti-trafficking legislation but that dependency on anti-trafficking entities does, but it also disproves the theory that countries comply because they value
women's rights.

Literature Review
The literature surveyed for this review supports the theory that ratifying human
rights treaties does not necessarily lead to the amelioration of human rights abuses,
and indeed may even worsen them. Thus it is put forth in this paper that ratifying the
Protocol does not better human rights, and the new theory proffered takes a different
view of theories about compliance after ratification by incorporating a gender component into the discussion about human rights norms concerning trafficking.

Theories in Literature Review
Before discussing the political literature concerning treaty ratification, the problem of sex trafficking will be set up in terms of theory of women's rights because it
is necessary to understand the origins of the subjugation of women. Discrimination
against women may not be as obvious in some societies, but this study shows that
even rich western European countries like Switzerland have problems with trafficking, and it is important to know where the idea that women are objects to be traded
and controlled comes from. In order to understand why women are not valued in society, it is necessary to look back to the very founding of states. States themselves are
reflections of male power, since men tend to dominate both their creation and governance (Pettman 1996,5). The concept of citizenship excluding females dates back to
the Greek polis, which saw citizenship as bestowed by a blood sacrifice to the state,
particularly in battle. Because of this, women were denied citizenship and a say in
the running of the state from early on. Instead, women were relegated to the private
sphere of the home, where they provided the support that allowed men to carry out
their citizenship in the public sphere (Pettman 1996, 6).
According to scholars, V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, the way we
see gender is based on two structures: socialization, or "how individuals are taught
culturally appropriate attitudes and behaviors," and structural control, which is
"how practices and institutions keep gender hierarchy in place by generating conformity and compliance" (Peterson and Runyan 1993,19). Once again looking to the
Greeks, Plato taught that instilling a sense of "natural" social hierarchy in subordinated peoples (that is, women) makes them less likely to rebel against the system
and challenge their status in society (Peterson and Runyan 1993, 21). This further
underlines the point that the subjugation of women is built into the state and societal
systems that have developed in the world-making it harder to combat. If women
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are devalued enough, they lose the status of human being and become objects to be
traded and sold at will.
In addition to feminist theory, two international relations articles and two sociology articles were consulted that question the implementation of human rights measures in countries that have ratified international agreements. Eric Neumayer (2005)
poses the questions of whether human rights treaties make a difference and whether
ratifying them improves human rights. Oona Hathaway (2002) asks if states comply
with the requirements of treaties they have signed and whether ratification leads to
better practice than would be expected without ratification. Olga Avdeyeva (2007) examines the gap between states' promises and actions regarding human rights agreements. Finally, Emilie Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui (2005) look at the impact
of international human rights norms on states' domestic practices.

Theoretical Similarities and Differences of the Articles on Ratification
The four articles listed above examined many of the same major schools of
thought such as (neo)realism, institutionalism, liberalism, and regime theory in order
to see if ratification improves compliance. Avdeyeva and Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui
also looked at sociological explanations such as the world society approach, which
argues that "models and norms that are institutionalized at the world level acquire
assumed status over time and influence policy makers at the national level" (HafnerBurton and Tsutsui 2005).
Interestingly, almost a11 of the authors opted not to agree with most of the expected outcomes from the theories they studied. Hathaway dismisses all her tested
theories except liberalism, which she says correctly predicts democracies to have better human rights practices when they ratify treaties; however, it still cannot explain
why all states do not do better. On the other hand, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005)
reject theories such as realism and liberalism as being too focused on power and actors. They favor a new explanation of compliance of their own; a mix of formal treaty
systems and nongovernmental activism based on rational and world society theory.
Avdeyeva (2007) also opts for the world society theory, which predicts that "the policy decision to ratify is often a symbolic gesture to signal that the government is not
a deviant actor, and does not necessarily lead to compliant practices with the treaty"
(Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005).

Similarities and Differences in Variables
The articles focused on a variety of variables to test whether ratification increased or decreased compliance. Neumayer used civil and personal integrity rights
to measure compliance with human rights agreements. Hathaway's test is similar, but
she looks for compliance with different parts of the treaty and evidence of whether
it is effective. Avdeyeva's approach was different as she was specifically measuring violence against women in post-Communist countries. She tests the regimes
to see whether their compliance or noncompliance with UN requirements is based
on "three mechanisms of social influence": coercion, persuasion, and acculturation,
largely rejecting the first two in favor of the latter, which is more closely linked to the
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world society model (Avdeyeva 2007). Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui measure government repression of human rights by looking at past practice, treaty ratification, INCa
membership, democracy, and more.
Most of the authors focus on measuring civil and political rights as well as other
similar ones such as democracy, which explains why they came, in general, to the
same conclusion that ratifying human rights agreements does not lead to better human rights. They also had similar conclusions as to which variables helped compliance and which did not; for example, democracy was generally recognized as leading to better human rights observance and conflict predicted the opposite. However,
there are distinctions within each theory that will be discussed further below.

Similarities and Differences in Findings
While the authors gathered some similar results, they also found differences.
Neumayer found that higher levels of democratization and INCa participation in
a country led to more compliance while regimes with no civil society showed no
positive effects from ratification, and possibly negative ones (Neumayer 2005). Hathaway also found that human rights compliance was generally better in countries
that ratified, but noncompliance was rampant even among them. Paradoxically, she
found that democracies usually had better practices but tended not to comply just
like non-democracies, which shows a different outcome than Neumayer predicted.
Both authors found that ratifying can worsen human rights; in other words, countries
with bad human rights records tend to ratify more treaties, which leads to overall
lower compliance.
Avdeyeva found in her analysis of post-Communist countries that the majority
did not comply with international standards for stopping violence against women.
She found that persuasion and coercion, standard measures of theories such as realism, were not too successful but that acculturation, including social pressure from
domestic and international actors, was an important factor. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) found a "decoupling between policy and practice" because governments
often sign agreements even when they know they cannot or will not comply, which
can worsen human rights as predicted by Neumayer and Hathaway. This leads
to a "paradox of empty promises" in which governments make empty promises
through ratification. However, they also found that INCas are creating worldwide
pressure for governments to comply with human rights. Links to civil society are
helpful, but ratification does not necessarily better the situation and can even worsen
human rights.
The overarching theme that can be seen from the authors' results is that ratifying international human rights treaties does not translate into better domestic practice.
The authors' theories focus on ratification as a strategic symbol in response to pressure
from inside and outside actors as well as international social norms. Ratifying a treaty,
as Hathaway explains, is often not a sign of the internalization of human rights norms
but rather a superficial placation. Furthermore, as Neumayer and Hathaway found,
democracies tend to have better human rights norms, and a strong civil society was
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universally acknowledged as a strong factor in determining compliance as it is helpful
in building human rights through its actions and media attention.

New Hypothesis
The hypothesis advanced by this author is that a country's ratifying of the Protocol will not in itself increase compliance with anti-trafficking norms but rather a
value for women's rights will cause a country to comply. An alternative hypothesis
is also tested, which is dependency on anti-trafficking entities such as the u.s. or EU.
This hypothesis follows the reasoning of Judith Kelley (2004), who points to membership conditionality in organizations as an important factor in states' compliance with
minority rights policy.
Based on the evidence provided by all the authors and particularly Avdeyeva,
(2007) Hafner-Burton, and Tsutsui (2005), it can be predicted that ratifying the Protocol will not lead to a significant increase in domestic anti-trafficking progress. The
issue of sex trafficking, like Avdeyeva's review of violence against women, is especially complicated because of the inclusion of gender in this situation. As Pettman
explained, states are reflections of male power, because they tend to dominate their
governance (1996, 5); for example, women made up less than one-third of every parliament in this study, and Peterson and Runyan (1993) further show that Western
countries have incorporated the subjugation of women along with the democratic
ideals of the Greek polis. The world will not make improvement in the area of women's rights and sex trafficking in particular until they overcome the implementation
problems discussed in the articles above and begin to apply the human rights norms
that many of them have supported through ratification.

Research Design
Theoretical Expectations
This theory includes four hypotheses to test whether women's rights or dependency leads to better compliance:
1. The higher the political power of women within a country, the more likely that

country is to comply with anti-sex trafficking provisions in the Protocol, because
then women are given a voice in policy formation.
2. The higher the social value of women in a country, the more likely that country
is to comply, because the society is invested in its women's futures.
3. The more legal protections women have in a country, the more likely that
country is to comply, because it shows dedication to protecting women's rights.
4. The more dependent a country is on powerful anti-trafficking entities such as
the u.s. and the EU, the more likely that country is to comply because of trade,
aid, and membership ties.
Goodliffe and Hawkins (2007) show that a country's trade network is very likely
to influence its ratification behavior, and Kelley (2004) shows that membership conditionality in European organizations is another important factor in states' compliance
with human rights norms.
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This theory also states that ratification will not lead to better compliance, and
this is tested through a combination of the average compliance scores based on the
above hypotheses. The dependent variable is the level of compliance with the antitrafficking norms laid out in the Protocol as described in the annual u.s. State Department Trafficking in Persons reports, coded on an original one to six scale. These
reports have been criticized as a source of information, but as they are released on a
consistent basis and are readily available, they are the most straightforward source
for this study. The independent variables are the level of political power of women in
a country, the level of social value of women, the legal culture of protection of women,
and the level of dependence on the u.S. and EU.
Procedure

The first part of this analysis was done through pattern-matching congruence
tables. Each table is time-lapsed, with two entries for each country. The first showing its status on the independent/ dependent variables before ratification and the
other after ratification. The first table contains data on five eastern European countries: Albania, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, and Romania, that ratified the Protocol
early (meaning before 2004). The exception is Moldova, which ratified it in 2005 and
it is too early to be included in the second table. Two of Moldova's data points have
an asterisk by them, indicating that the data shown is from the year of ratification
or the year after; these two points must be analyzed with care as they do not allow
for the post-ratification time lapse that the rest of the data does. The second table
contains data from five countries that either ratified the Protocol late (2006 or later)
or have not yet ratified it, which gives examples of states who are not bound to
implement the Protocol's norms or who have not yet had ample time to implement
it. These countries are the Czech Republic, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, and Switzerland. Greece and Switzerland are not eastern European countries, but they are
included because Greece is near the region and has not developed as fast as many of
the other EU countries, and Switzerland is an interesting case, because even though
it has a very good human rights record, it tends to ratify women's rights treaties
late. The data from these two tables was divided into levels of low, medium, and
high for each variable to make it easier to see patterns. In this way the results may
be compared to see if changes happening in the countries that have ratified are due
to ratification or if they are a region-wide phenomenon.

Data
There are many observable implications for each hypothesis:
1. Political Power: This will be measured by the percent of women in the legislative body. This can be found at womanstats.org under the variable LBHO
data 1 or from the Inter-Parliamentary Union's data on women's participation in
politics. Another measure of women's power is whether they have the right of
suffrage, which can be found under the womanstats variable VOTE law 1 or in
the u.s. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights.
89

SIGMA

2. Social Value: A country that values its women and their input and potential
should provide them with healthcare. Indicators such as maternal mortality and
infant mortality show whether or not women are receiving good health care
during one of the most vulnerable times of their life. Maternal mortality can be
found in the annual World Health Statistics reports from the WHO and infant
mortality can be accessed at the CIA World Factbook web site.
3. Legal Protection: There are many good measures of legal protection for women. One example is age of marriage laws because a country that values women
will not allow them to be married underage. This information may be found
at womanstats.org under the variable AOM law 1 as well as in CEDAW and
CRC reports. Another indicator is maternity leave because it shows that the state
wants to take care of mothers economically. This is also found in the CEDAW
reports, as well as in the GIC variable cluster at womanstats.org.
4. Dependence: The U.s. is known to be an anti-trafficking force because of
the annual reports it releases. Furthermore, the u.s. began putting sanctions
on and removing aid from countries that were in Tier 3, the lowest rating the
report gives (U.s. State Department 2003). Countries who are dependent on the
U.S. for trade or aid may comply with trafficking norms in order to continue to
receive favor. Data on U.S. trade partners, including imports and exports, may
be found at the U.S. International Trade Commission web site. Data on U.s.
foreign aid may be found in the USAID greenbook and the OECD Stat Extracts.
In the case of the EU, countries trying to join may have made efforts to comply
with norms as an example of membership conditionality. This is observable
through process tracing, such as through the annual European Commission
reports on candidate countries, although not all of the states being studied are
EU members or are trying to join.
It is also important to define the observable implications for the dependent variable (level of compliance). One measure of compliance with the anti-trafficking norms
is the one to three scale used by the u.s. State Department in its Trafficking in Persons
reports. These reports and the Protocol use very similar language, including a focus
on the three Ps: prevention, prosecution, and protection. However, my measure will
be an original one to six scale based on the information in the U.S. State Department
trafficking reports, because it expands the one to three scale, showing more variation.
A note must also be made about the cases chosen for this study. States were chosen based on when they ratified the Protocol. This may lead to some selection bias
but the ten countries include a good selection of eastern European states, and other
countries could easily be added. Furthermore, these countries were chosen because
they share some fundamental characteristics; they are predominantly Christian, except for Albania (CIA Factbook 2008), and many are former Soviet satellite states. Any
differences will be taken into account during analysis.
All ten countries will be included in a congruence table and pattern matched to
see which ones provide the best variation on the independent and dependent vari90
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abIes. Romania and the Czech Republic will then be process traced to see if their history matches the patterns found in the congruence tables and proves the hypotheses.
I hope to see variation in many of the variables; indicators, such as maternal mortality
and women in parliament, will likely vary greatly, while fundamental legal protections will likely be more regionally similar.

Criteria for Verification
The questions of whether compliance with the Protocol is due to women's status
and whether ratification leads to better compliance can be suffiCiently answered by
evidence obtained from the hypotheses. If the data shows that women have political
power, social value, or legal protection and that country has a high compliance score,
then the theory that countries comply more when they value women will be proved.
If the evidence shows that women have power, protection, and value, but the country
still does not comply, then the theory will be proven wrong. If the fourth hypothesis---compliance is based on dependence--proves true, then further research will
see whether the value of women or the self-interest hypothesis holds more weight in
states' decisions. Finally, if the countries' average ratification scores are worse after
ratification than before, the theory that ratification does not lead to better compliance
will be proved. Therefore, I will be satisfied that my thesis is correct if I find a convincing body of evidence to show that states do not have better compliance because
of ratification but rather because they value women, or alternatively because they are
more dependent on anti-trafficking entities.

Findings
Results

The results of the congruence table do not show many patterns although Moldova, Romania, and Georgia stand out for having many contrary results. The tables
show the values in categories of low, medium, and high that were calculated according to the range of numerical values for each variable. After the results of the congruence tables are more tables that use averages to explore whether or not ratification of
the Protocol itself has an effect on compliance. Also note when reading the tables that
one is the worst compliance score and six is the best.
The percentage of women in the parliament did not show definitive results in
either table. Ideally, an increase in the number of women in parliament should also
show an increase in the dependent variable. The only country in the first table to
change is Moldova, whose percentage increased from 8.9 percent to 21.8 percent from
2000 to 2008, but whose compliance score actually worsened from three to two. Furthermore, Romania's score stayed at low even though its compliance score increased.
The only country to show the expected result is Albania, which stayed at low and
whose compliance score stayed at two, a very low score. In the second table, both
Georgia and Hungary remained at low even though both of their compliance scores
increased. However Greece showed a favorable result, increasing from low to medium and from two to three on the compliance scale.
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Political Power
Countries that ratified early
IV; Political Power
percent of women
in legislature
(2000, 2008)

IV; Political Power
date of suffrage
for women

(1-6, worst to best)

Albania
pre-8/02

LOW

1920

2

Albania
post--8/02

LOW

--

2

Lithuania
pre-6/03

MED

1918

3

Lithuania
post-6/03

MED

--

4

Moldova
pre-9/05

LOW

1978,1993

3

Moldova
post-9/05

HIGH

--

2

Poland
pre-9/03

MED

1918

3

Poland
post-9/03

MED

--

4

Romania
pre-12/02

LOW

1929, 1946

2

Romania
post-12/02

LOW

--

3

Date of
ratification

DV; compliance
(2001, 2008)

Countries that ratified late/have not ratified
IV; Political Power
percent of women
in legislature
(2000, 2008)

IV; Political Power
date of suffrage
for women

Czech Rep

MED

1920

3

Czech Rep

MED

--

5

Georgia
pre-9/06

LOW

1918,1921

3

Georgia
post-9/06

LOW

--

5

Greece

LOW

1952

2

Greece

MED

--

3

Hungary
pre-12/06

LOW

1918

3

Date of
ratification

92
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(2001, 2008)
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Hungary
post-12/06

LOW

--

4

Switzerland
post-l0/06

HIGH

1971

6

Switzerland
post-l0/06

HIGH

--

6

The dates of suffrage cannot be measured through time but it is interesting that
in the first table all the countries allowed suffrage fairly early except Moldova, whose
compliance score is also among the worst. However, a look at the second table shows
that Switzerland, the country with the best compliance score, did not give women the
right to vote until 1971, so this variable does not correlate either. The results from this
variable are too mixed and the hypothesis that giving women political power leads to
better compliance has been proven false.

Social Value
Countries that ratified early
IV: Social Value
MMratio
(2000, 2005)
/100,000

IV: Social Value
infant mortality
(2000, 2008)
/1,000

DV: compliance
(1-6, worst to best)
(2001, 2008)

Albania
pre-8/02

HIGH

HIGH

2

Albania
post-8/02

HIGH

LOW

2

Lithuania
pre-6/03

LOW

LOW

3

Lithuania
post-6/03

LOW

LOW

4

Moldova
pre-9/05

MED

HIGH

3

Moldova
post-9/05

LOW*

LOW

2

Poland
pre-9/03

LOW

LOW

3

Poland
post-9/03

LOW

LOW

4

Romania
pre-12/02

HIGH

LOW

2

Romania
post-12/02

MED

MED

3

Date of
ratification

The maternal mortality ratio shows more correlation. In the first table, Lithuania
and Poland had low scores for each year and Romania decreased from high to medium. All three of these countries also showed improvement in their compliance scores.
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Albania remained at high and its score stayed at two, also showing correlation. The
only country that does not fit is Moldova, whose maternal mortality decreased but
whose score worsened. The results of the second table were similar. Every country
except Georgia remained low and all of their compliance scores got better. Georgia,
however, went from medium to high mortality even though its score increased.

Countries that ratified late/have not ratified
IV: Social Value
MMratio
(2000, 2005)

IV: Social Value
infant mortality
(2000, 2008)

Czech Republic

LOW

LOW

3

Czech Republic

LOW

LOW

5

Georgia
pre-9/06

MED

HIGH

3

Georgia
post-9/06

HIGH

LOW

5

Greece
Greece

LOW
LOW

LOW
LOW

2
3

Hungary
pre-12/06

LOW

LOW

3

Hungary
post-12/06

LOW

LOW

4

Switzerland
post-IO/06

LOW

LOW

6

Switzerland
post-IO/06

LOW

LOW

6

Date of
ratification

DV: compliance
(1-6, worst to best)

(2001, 2008)

For infant mortality the results were mixed in the first table. Albania and Moldova decreased even though Albania's score stayed at two and Moldova's worsened,
yet Romania showed an increase even though its compliance increased. The second
table showed different results. Every country except Georgia had low mortality and
better compliance (Switzerland's score remained a six, but as this is the highest score,
it will be treated as an increase). Georgia drastically reduced mortality during the
period and increased its compliance, showing very good results. Overall, maternal
mortality shows correlation with the dependent variable and infant maternity shows
some correlation, so the social value of women hypothesis still holds.

Legal Culture
Countries that ratified early
Date of
ratification
Albania
pre-8/02

IV: Legal Culture
laws on age
of marriage

IV: Legal Culture
policies on
maternity leave

(1-6, worst to best)

16F IBM 1982

365 days partial pay 2000

2

94
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(2001, 2008)
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Albania
post--8/02
Lithuania
pre-6/03
Lithuania
post-6/03
Moldova
pre-9/05
Moldova
post-9/05
Poland
pre-9/03
Poland
post-9/03
Romania
pre-12/02
Romania
post-12/02

18 F/M 2003

--

2

18F/M

70 +56 days 1998

3

--

--

4

16F IBM 1998

70 +56 days paid 2004

3

--

--

2

18F 21M 1964

16--18 weeks paid 2000amended 2001

3

--

--

4

16F IBM 2000

112 days, 50-94% pay 2000

2

--

126 days 2003

3

Countries that ratified late/have not ratified
IV: Legal Culture
laws on age of
marriage

IV: Legal Culture
policies on
maternity leave

DV: compliance
(1--6, worst to
best)
(20012008)

18 F/M 2000

--

3

--

Good coverage 2003

5

16 F/M 1998

70 +56 days 1998

3

18 F /M 2000/03

--

5

18 F/M 1996

16 weeks 75% pay 2000

2

--

--

3

Hungary
pre-12/06

18F/M2000

24 weeks 100% pay
2000

3

Hungary
post-12/06

--

--

4

Switzerland
post-1O/06

18 F/M 1996

8--12 weeks mom and
dad 100% pay 1998

6

Switzerland
post-l0/06

--

--

6

Date of
ratification
Czech Republic
Czech Republic
Georgia
pre-9/06
Georgia
post-9/06
Greece
Greece

The age of marriage laws did not show a correlation in the first table. Albania is the
only country to show an improvement, yet its compliance score did not increase. Both
Moldova and Romania's unequal age laws remained unchanged, yet their scores did
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change; this inequality cannot correlate with improvement in compliance. There is better correlation in the second table. Georgia changed its marriage law to make it equal;
however, it did this around 2000---not around ratification in 2006. Every country in
both tables showed acceptable maternity leave coverage no matter what their compliance score and many countries' policies were similar, so these results are inconclusive,
and the legal protection hypothesis has been proven false for these countries.

Dependence
Countries that ratified early
IV:
Development
U.S. aid
(2000, 2006)
millions

IV:
Development
imports to U.S.
(2000, 2007)
millions

IV:
Development
U.s. domestic
exports
(2000, 2007)
millions

DV:
compliance
(1-6, worst
to best)
(2001, 2008)

MED

LOW

LOW

2

MED

LOW

LOW

2

LOW

LOW

LOW

3

Lithuania
post-6/03

LOW

LOW

LOW

4

Moldova
pre-9/0S
Moldova
post-9/0S

MED

LOW

LOW

3

LOW'

LOW

LOW

2

Poland
pre-9/03
Poland
post-9/03
Romania
pre-12/02

LOW

MED

LOW

3

LOW

HIGH

HIGH

4

MED

LOW

LOW

2

Romania
post-12/02

LOW

MED

LOW

3

Date of
ratification

Albania
pre-8/02
Albania
post-8/02
Lithuania
pre--{i/03

Countries that ratified late/have not ratified
IV:
Development
U.s. aid
(2000,2006)
millions

IV:
Development
imports to U.s.
(2000, 2007)
millions

IV: Development
u.s. domestic
exports
(2000, 2007)
millions

DV:
compliance
(1-6, worst
to best)
(2001, 2008)

Czech
Republic

LOW

MED

LOW

3

Czech
Republic

LOW

HIGH

MED

5

Date of
ratification
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Georgia
pre-9/06

HIGH

LOW

LOW

3

Georgia
post-9/06
Greece

HIGH

LOW

LOW

5

LOW

LOW

MED

2

Greece

LOW

MED

HIGH

3

Hungary
pre-12/06

LOW

HIGH

LOW

3

Hungary
post-12/06

LOW

HIGH

MED

4

Switzerland
post-IO/06

--

HIGH

HIGH

6

Switzerland
post-IO/06

--

HIGH

HIGH

6

The three dependence variables show correlation as well. In the first table, Moldova went from medium to low aid and also declined in compliance, which could
show correlation. This is countered by Romania, who also went from medium to low
aid but whose score increased. In the second table, every country remained at the
same level aid and all of their scores decreased. Only Georgia had high aid and it
also increased in compliance. This variable is interesting because it shows an almost
universal decrease in aid to countries that ratified early and an increase in aid to
countries that ratified late/ never. It will require further research and data analysis
to explain this.
The second variable, imports from the country to the U.s., shows correlation. In
the first table Albania and Moldova, the two countries that either stayed the same
or decreased in compliance, both remained at low levels of exports. Poland and Romania increased exports and both also increased in compliance. In the second table,
every country increased both in exports and in compliance except Georgia, which
remained at low even though its score increased.
The last variable, U.s. domestic exports, also shows correlation. In the first table,
all countries correlated except Romania. Every country in the second table increased
in exports (and showed better compliance) except Georgia, who remained at low despite the significanf increase in its compliance score. All three dependency hypotheses show correlation overall with occasional contrary results. The effect of this dependency and its source, whether the U.s., EU, or elsewhere, will be explored further
through process tracing in the two case studies that follow.

Ratification
In order to test whether ratification itself makes a difference, the average compliance score for each of the six quantifiable independent variables based on its level
(low, medium, high) both before and after ratification were put into tables. Because
the countries from the second table either have not ratified or have not had enough
97

SIGMA

time since ratification to show real change, both their pre- and post-ratification scores
were included in the pre-ratification section. This means that only the five countries
that ratified early are shown in the post-ratification column.
% women in legislature
Low
Medium

Pre-ratification

Post-ratification

3.625

2.5

3.4

4

6

2

4.34

2.83

Pre-ratification

Post-ratification

3.8

3.33

Medium

3

3

High

3

2

3.26

2.776

Pre-ratification

Post-ratification

High
Total average for all levels
Maternal mortality ratio
Low

Total average for all levels
Infant mortality rate
Low

3.75

3

--

3

High

2.66

--

Total average for all levels

2.136

2

Pre-ratification

Post-ratification

Low

3.8

3.25

Medium

2.33

2

Medium

U.S. aid

High
Total average for all levels
Imports
Low
Medium
High
Total average for all levels
Exports
Low
Medium
High
Total average for all levels

4

--

3.376

1.74

Pre-ratification

Post-ratification

2.857

2.66

3

3

4.8

4

3.552

3.22

Pre-ratification

Post-ratification

3

2.75

3.66

--

5

4

3.886

2.25
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These tables show that for every variable the total score is higher before ratification. This is partially the result of including the late/ non-ratifiers in the pre-ratification
column; however, since their results are better even without ratification, this is the correct outcome. This shows that ratification alone does not lead to better compliance. In
fact, the data results of the late/ non-ratifiers (minus Georgia) were better in almost
every instance, which further shows that ratification is not a critical part of compliance.
Interestingly, just as Neumayer (2005) predicted, it seems that the stronger democracies
like Switzerland and the Czech Republic had better results and consequently better
scores than the countries that struggled such as Georgia and Romania.

Case Studies
Process tracing was used on two of the states in order to see what factors were
causing them to comply. The first case is Romania and the second is the Czech Republic.
Romania

Romania applied for membership in the EU in June 1995 but did not officially
join until January 2007 and even then was under restriction while its progress in fighting organized crime and government corruption was evaluated (BBC 2006). Each
year the European Commission (EC) releases monitoring reports on candidate countries that highlight successes, failures, and further needs before joining the EU. In the
1998 Romanian report, no mention of human trafficking could be found and only
brief mention was made in 1999. In 2000, it said that more women are being trafficked
for prostitution and that no progress was being made in fighting domestic trafficking
rings (EC 2000, 22). In 2001, it was noted that while trafficking remained a problem,
some efforts have been made to curb it (EC 2001, 110, 86). The government ran an
awareness program in October 2000, and in 2001, it appointed a commission over
trafficking; however, the EU stated that this progress was not sufficient (EC 2001, 25).
There is an obvious change in the prevalence of trafficking between the 2000 and 2001
reports, perhaps indicating increased concern by the EU, and in this time, Romania
also made several efforts to combat it.
The 2002 report indicated further reform as well as further scrutiny by the EU
(EC 2002, 20, 113). The 2003 report is similar and mentioned Romania's ratification of
the Protocol (EC 2003, 105-106, 24). In the 2004 report, the words "trafficking in human beings" are in bold, indicating their importance. The report praises the increase
in convictions but "Cites the need for more inter-agency cooperation. The section is
longer than before, further indicating its importance for the EU (EC 2004, 24-25). The
2005 report is the most detailed of them all, actually giving the issue its own section.
There is still some criticism, but it is evident that Romania is much more in line with
the EU's standards (EC 2005,15). From 2002-08, Romania was listed as a Tier 2 country by the u.s. State Department, indicating that it does not fully comply with legislation but that it is trying to, which mirrors the progress in the EC reports.
One recurrent issue in the EC reports is the treatment of children. Under communist rule, abortion was outlawed, which led to many unwanted children and a culture
of abandoning them. This is a problem because international adoption has been used
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as a ruse to traffic Romanian children. The EU set a moratorium on it in 2001 after
working with Romanian officials (Rosenthal 2005). However, the New York Times said
in 2001 that the u.s. was pressuring Romania to ignore it. The adoptions continued
into 2004, according to the New York Times, "Emma Nicholson, of Britain, a senior
member of the European Parliament's foreign affairs committee, has urged European
governments to suspend entry talks with Romania (2004).
Then Romanian newspaper, Nine O'Clock ran an article in June 2004 in which EU
officials "commended the cease of 'trafficking in children' by Romania" (Dumitriu
2004). By 2005, Romania had introduced a full ban. This time the New York Times
wrote, "Would-be parents in the United States and other western countries have repeatedly called on Romania, which wants to join the European Union next year, to
rescind the law" (New York Times 2006). This shows that the EU played a bigger role
in Romania's decisions than the U.S. and this correlates with the dependency data,
which shows that Romania does not rely heavily on u.s. aid or exports.
The EC reports show a growing concern about trafficking from year to year. As
can be seen, Romania made progress each year along with the EU's recommendations, and by the 2005 report, the situation in Romania was much better than it had
been a few years earlier. The example of child protection shows that Romania formed
its policy around the EU's wishes, flouting the United States. This case study shows
that for Romania, EU membership conditionality was an important and determining
factor in its anti-trafficking compliance, proving the fourth hypothesis.

Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is better off than Romania, but it has yet to ratify the Protocol, although it signed it in December 2000. It is obvious that ratification is not the
reason why this state complies with anti-trafficking legislation, but it nevertheless
complies. From 2002-05 and 2007-08 it was ranked as a Tier 1 country by the u.s.
State Department. The Czech Republic joined the EU in 2004. In its 1998 and 1999 EC
reports, trafficking was briefly mentioned as a problem to be addressed (EC 1998, 33;
1999,15). In 2000 and 2001, the EC noted that trafficking was an ongoing problem and
an area of concern for the EU ( EC 2000, 23; 2001, 15, 104). The 2002 report was similar
and notice was drawn to some improvements (EC 2002,19,146,115).
The issue of human trafficking does not command as much attention in the
Czech Republic'S EC reports as it did in Romania's. In 2004, The Prague Post ran an
interview with John Miller, the director of the U.S. State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. It discussed the successes and failures of
the Czech Republic'S efforts and also touched on some interesting points, such as the
U.S. being a moral bully. The question was asked whether the U.s. influences other
governments' compliance. Then-Ambassador Miller's answer implicated Greece, another country in this study:
A year ago, in our Trafficking in Persons Report, we listed a host of countries
in Tier 3, those not making significant efforts to stop trafficking. Included were
some friends of ours, Greece and Turkey. In the three months after the report
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came out ... you found increased efforts at education, public service announcements directed at potential victims. You found law-enforcement training courses
sensitizing police to look for victims, not just treating them as illegal immigrants.
You found more arrests and prosecutions; you found more funding for NGOs
helping victims. The point is to see progress (Spritzer 2004).
The example of the Czech Republic shows that EU membership conditionality
was not hugely important, and the country is still making efforts to combat trafficking
despite not having ratified the Protocol. However, the interview showed that the u.s.
believes that other countries like Greece are dependent enough on it that they will
change their behavior. For countries like Greece, the dependency hypothesis holds.

Conclusion
This study set out to see why eastern European countries comply with antitrafficking legislation as described in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons. It put forth the theory that compliance is not based on
ratification but rather on a value for women and also tested an alternative hypothesis of dependency. The results of the congruence tables disprove the theory that
states comply because of women's rights. However, it would be interesting to see
the results if the analysis was performed on another part of the world.
Despite disproving this theory, the results did prove that ratification itself does
not increase compliance, since the tables of averages clearly show that the total compliance scores were better before ratification than after. The fact that the countries that
ratified late/ never had such good scores also shows that ratification is not important.
It is interesting to note that compliance actually decreased after ratification as the
articles in the literature review predicted. Also, Neumayer (2005) found that democracies were more likely to comply, which seems to be true of the countries in this
study no matter when they ratified. This study also proved the alternative theory that
dependency is important for compliance. Romania clearly showed that membership
conditionality was very important. This proves the theory of Kelley (2004) as well as
the socialization arguments of Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005). At the time of application to the EU, Romania was making few efforts, but by the time of accession, it had
made many-guided by the EU. The Czech Republic neither proved nor disproved
the dependency hypothesis, but it showed that the u.s.' s efforts to stop trafficking do
have an effect on countries such as Greece.
It is interesting to note as well that the existence of the Protocol itself may be a sign
that countries do not ratify because of concern for women. CEDAW includes a section
about trafficking, yet since this treaty took effect the problem of trafficking has grown
and become more complex. This new Protocol, by being part of a treaty on transnational
organized crime, reframes the issue of trafficking as a criminal matter. This moves the
focus from the victim to the perpetrator, and time will show if this change is working.
Just as the emphasis on the protocol instead of CEDAW shows a shift in framing, the results of this study show that compliance is not so much a human rights
issue as it is an economic and national self-interest issue. Since increased trade or
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inclusion in the EU leads to a better economy, it seems that compliance becomes
more feasible when countries have more wealth, a better economy, and more power.
This provides the funds needed to fight trafficking, and a better economy may shift
jobs away from black market activities to legal professions. Therefore, based on the
results of this study, dependency ties with states that suffer from trafficking should
be increased in an effort to persuade them to comply more, because ratification,
while a symbolic gesture, is not enough to increase compliance alone. Finally, although countries do not comply because of a value for women, this should still be
strived for as it is an important foundation for eventually solvirrg the international
problem of sex trafficking.
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